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Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics
ABSTRACT
Thispaper develops a highly simplified model of exchanqe
rate behavi or wi thin the band under a target zone r egi me. It shows
that. the expectation that authorities wii.l defend theband exerts
a stabilizing eff oct on exchange rate behavior wi thin the band,
even when the authori. ties are not actively i ritervening. The extent
of stabilization can be related in astraightforward way to three
factors: the sensitivity of the currentexchange rate toexpected
depreciation, the volatility of the processdriving exchange rate
"fundamentals',and the credi hi. ii ty of the commitmentby




Cambridge, MA 02138It seems fairly likely that over the next fewyears the world
monetary system will shift from one of freely floating rates to
one inwhichgovernments commit themsel yes to keep exchange rates.
wi thin broad tar get zones. Despi te the popular ity of the concept
however, little research has been done on hOW suchtarget. zones
would operate in practice. In pirti cul an, how willexchange rates
behave irisite the target zone? A naive view miqht, he thatthe
exchange rate will behave as if it were freely floating until it
hits the edge of the band, then act like a fixed rate.With
forwar-d—lookinqspecul ators, however, this cannot be ri cht: the
expectation that the rate Will he stabiiizec:1 it' it moves too far
should affect i t.s behavi. or even when rio acti \'e stahl Ii zat ionis
takingplace.
This paper presents a simple model of exchange rate behavior
under a target zone regime. It is essentially thesame as the
modeL presented in Kr ugman.1 987); the di ffer erices are techni cal
and exposi tional ,buthopefully this 'icr sion does produce some
value—added,The main newelements areacontinuous—time
formulation of the process driving "fundamentals", anda different
approach to the determination of the pci nt at which the exchange
rate reaches the edge of t.he band. In the present version of the
model,itispossible to derive a surprisingly simple closed—form
analysis of the effectsof' a target zone on the exchange rate. As
thepaper shows, a target zone will lead to more stable exchange
rate behavior within the zone than free fi oatirig. The extent of
stabilization can be related inastraightforward way to the
1volatility of the fundamentals driving the exchange rate, the
sensitivityof the exchange rate toexpected appreciation or
depreciation,arid the credibility of the government commitment. to
defend the target. zone.
THEMODEL
The exchange rate is assumed to be determined by two factors:
"fundamentals", which evol ye exogenous 1 y over ti me, and i ts own
expected rate of change. For the purposes of the model, it is not
important. to specify exactly what the fundamentals are; they miht
be monetary variables, or they might include a variet.y of other
factors. All that we need is the assumption that the fundamental.
1 evel of the logarithm of the exchange rate, which is the rate
that would prevail if neither- appreciatiora nor- depreciation were
expected, fol lows a di ffusi on process over t. i me:
Ci) dxodz
which implies that. the variance over a period t I.s simply
It is useful to make a dist-incti on between the exchange rate
that would prevailin the absence ofactive government
intervention, and the actual exchange rate that prevails given
that inter veriti on. Let us denote the log of the non--i rit.er vent on
exchange rate as s; it isrelated to the fundamentals and to
expected changes in the exchange rate by
2C2)s =x+ 'Efds/dt.]
The actual exchange rateis assumed to be limited by the
commitmentof the authorities to keep the rate withina target.
zonewhose upper limit is s and whose lower limit is s. Exactly
how the authorities do this will not be specified in the model.
Oneexamplethat may clarify the point is to imagine that x
represents domestic credit, and that.. unsterilized intervention
takesplace when the exchange rate crosses the edges of the band.
However, the model is more general than this, and mayencompass a
variety ofdifferent mechanisms. However it is done,we assume
that whenever the shadow exchange rate would lie outside the
target zone, the author! ties are able to insure that the actual
exchange rate remains at t.he boundary:
(3) s =sif s > s
S =Sif S >S>
s =sif s > s
Finally,for converii ence it is helpful to choose uni ts so
that the band is centered around zero, i.e., s =— s.
This is an extremely simple, rudimentary model of the
exchange rate. In particular, two of the usual sources of
interesting dynamics in exchange rate models are lacking: because
of the random walk assumption about fundamentals, there is noroom
3for responses to anticipated future shocks; also, the model lacks
any intrinsic" dynamicsarising from slowly adjusting variables
such asthe distribution of world wealth or a sticky domestic
pricelevel. The payoff to excluding these important and realistic
issues itthat it allows usto focus solely on the impact of the
target zone on exchange rate dynamics; as we will see, we can
derive some surprisingly clear and powerful conclusions about this
impact.
EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR INSIDE THE BAND
Inside the target zone the actual and shadowexchange rates
coincide,so that the exchange rate obeys the equation
(4) s =x+E[ds/dt.]
The way to solve for exchange rate behavior is to look for an
equilibrium in state spacethat is, for an equilibrium
function s =g(x)such that (4) is always satisfied. We note that
when x follows the diffusion process Cl),andwhere gC.) has a
cont.inuotis second derivative, the expected rate of change of s is
determined by
(5) E[ds/dt] =g'Cx)E[dx/dtJ+(l/2)g''Cx)E[Cdx/dt)2)
Sincex follows a diffusion process without drift, ECdx/dt]
40; thus CS) reducesto
CS) E(dsdt3=g"Cx)o2
It follows that the function gC.) mustbeone for which
C7) gCx)x +Cyo'2'2)g"Cx)
Afunction forwhichC?) holds is
C8)sgCx) x+Ae'X+Be
wherethe value of r may be determined by substituting into C?):
CQ) x +rx+Bex 4Cyor2r2,2)CAe1C+
implying
ClO) r =J 2,yo
The function C8) may be simplified by exploiting the symmetry
of the assumed target zone. Since the target zone is centered
around zero, and since there is no drift in the fundamentals, we
can assume that gCO) c0.This can only be true if B =-A. Sothe
function gCx) actually takes the form
S- rx --rx (11)s=x+A[e —e I
As we will see in a moment, in a target zone A must be
negative.This implies an S--shaped curve 1 .i ke that shown in Figure
1, one for which s K x in the upper part of the target zone and s
> x in the lower part ---thatis, the S lies below the 4 degree
line in the upper- part. of the band and below it. in the lower- part.
To understand this gecimeLr-y, it. is useful to rearrange C?) to
get
(12) s --xCya2/2)g''Cx)
This says that the deviation of the exchange rat.e from the
fundamentalisproportionaltotheconvexit.ofthe
fundamentals—exchange rate relationship. The reason is Jensen's
inequality: since the expected chartge in x is zero, the expected
change in the exchange rate, which is a functi on of x, is positive
where this functi on is convex, negati ye where this furict i on is
concave. In the lower part. of the target zone, where g(x) is
convex, the expected change in the exchange rate is pcsi tive; this
"drags" the exchange rate above the 4 degree line. Conversely, i r
the upper part of the zone the concavity of gCx) implies an
expected depreciation that drags the exchange rate below the
fundamental.
THESTAB I LI ZI NG EFFECT OF THE TARGET ZONE
6For the gCx) drawn in Fiqure 1, it is apparent that the
target zone has astabilizing effecton the exchange rate within
theband. The S—curve is always flatter than the 45—degree line,
implying that fluctuations in the fundamental x are less than
fully reflected in the exchange rate; this is in contrast. to free
floating, in which the exchange rate would simplymoveup ard down
the 45--degree line. Interestingly, this stabilization takes place
even when the authorities are not actively defendi rig the band:
they only have to act. when the fundamentals reach the levels x or
x. The reason is of course the expectation that they' will defend
the zone in future if necessary. Because of this, when the
exchange rate is near the top of the band, it essentially has more
room to go down than up, and conversely at the bottom; the market
recognizesthis,andt hi sreal i zati on createsr egr essi ye
expectations thatstabilize the rate.
Butdoes the function gCx) actually lie in theposition
indicated? To show this, we need to demonstrate that A in equation
Cli) is in fact negative —-orwhat is the same thing, that gCx)
is in fact S-shaped.
The key to demonstrating this is to focus on bow gCx)
intersects the edge of the band. As drawn inFigurei, the
function gCx is exactly tangent to the limits of the target zone.
What we need to show is that this is the correct depiction.
Figure 2 ShOWSthreepossible ways in which gCx) might
intersect s.Incase 1 a convex gCx) crosses s; in case 2 a
7concave gcx) does the same thing; incase3 a concave gCx is just
tangent to s. Which of these is the correct picture?
Recall two points. First, I or x > x, the level at which
intervention by the authorities becomes necessary, we have s =s.
Thus in each case the actual exchange rate path is indicatedby
the heavy line, and the continuation of gCx) is indicatedby the
-S brokenline. Secondly, intervention takes place only when s >s.
In each of the case indicated in Figure 2. we denoteby E the
first point at whichtheauthorities intervene. What we can show
is that in cases 1 and 2, s at point E is less thans. That is,
if the perceived fundamentals—exchange raterealtionship were as
illustrated, the exchange rate at E would be dragged back inside
the band, contradicting the assumption that intervention becomes
necessaryat S. Only in case 3 is s > s. Thus only atangency
equilibrium is possible.
Consider what happens in cases 1 and 2. If s were to remain
equal to gCx), then s at x would equal gCx); that is the
definition of gCx). However in both cases 1 and2, ifx rises
above x, s is constrained to lie below gCx); while if x lies below
x,s is still ongCx). Thus the ected change in s is
unambiguously smaller than on gçx). This implies that s <gCx) at
E---contradictingtheassumptionthat E lies on the band.
Incase 3, by contrast, at x > x we have s > gCx), because
gCx)hasturned downward. Thus in that case s > gCOs, and the
exchangerate does lie on the band.
An alternative way of thinking about this result, which
8recalls our interpretation of the geometry of g(x),is.to note
that in cases 1 and 2 the actual relationship between x and s is
less convex than g(x). implying an s below g(x); only in case 3 is
the r ci ati onshi p mor-e convex.
A similar argument rules out any gCx) that turns downward
before reaching 5:itis straightforward to show that the point at
which such a gCx) would cross s on the way down is equally
urisustai riabi e.
The equilibriumg(x),then, mustheprecisely tangent to the
topofthe band (and by symmetry to the bottom as well). This
obsrvation allows us to der-ive a simple measure of the extent to
which the targetzone stabi ii zes expectations.
The key is thatg(x)reachesa maximumof s at x. Thus we may
differentiate(ii) toget
rx
(13) âs/äxl—1 -4-rACe -e1 0 x
implying
rx -rx (14) Ate—e ]
At the same time,
— — rx —rx C1) sx +Ale —e
Thus we have
g-- 21/2 (16) x -s=1/r= /2)
Nownotice that x —sis a measure of the stabilizingeffect
ofthe band on the exchange rate. If there were no target. zone,
the exchange rate would fluctuate up and down the 45-degree line,
and would therefore cross the value s when x equalled s. What the
targetzone does is to create stabiliiizir,g expectations that keep
the rate within the band for a widened range of fundamentals even
when the authorities are not currently i ntez-vening; the extentof
that widening ismeasured by x5.Wenote that the stabilizing
effect depends on two parameters: y, which is the sensitivity of
the exchange rate to the expected rate of depreciation, and
the volatility of the fundamentals.
DYNAMICS WITH IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY
Up to this point we have assumed thatthemarket. believes
that the authorities will infact.do whatever is necessary to
defendthe tar get.zone. Real I sti call y, of course, we need to take
intoaccount. the possibility of a failure t.o honor commitments.
Fortunately,it. isnow straightfor-ward to consider the possibility
ofan imperfectly credible target. zone.
Suppose that themarketbelieves that the zone will be
defended with probability ,andthat with probability 1- no
10response wi. 11 occur when the exchanqe rate reachses the edge of
the hand. Then what will happen when the exchange rate does reach
theedge of the band is a testing of theauthorities'resolve. If
the authorities do defend the band, they will now have a fully
credibletarget zone; if theydonot,the systemwillrevert to
freefloating.
The consequence of such a test is shown ir Figure 3. Suppose
that the exchange rate reaches the edge of the zone when the
fundamentals reach the level x. Then if the authorities turn out
to be credible, the exchange ratewill move onto its full
credibility schedule at gC), while if they do not it will jump to
the46—degreeline at x. Since the market knows that one of these
two events will occur, and since any expectedjumpwouldleid an
infiniteexpected rate of appreciation,is defined implicitly by
the requirement that the expected jump equal zero:
C17) s =gCx)+C1—Ø)x
Corresponding to this new intersection isafundamentals
exchange—raterelationship defined by choosing A so that the
function intersects the edge oftheband at x. We can call this
gCx,).It isimmediately apparent that <x, andtherefore
gCx4)issteeper than gCx). Thus imperfect credibility reduces
the stabilizing effect of the target zone. It is also apparent
thatas 0goesto one,gCx, 0)convergestogCx),while as goes
tozeroitmergeswith the 46-degree line.
i-iCONCLUSI ONS
This paper has set out a highly simplified model of exchange
rate behavior under a target zone regime. The method of solution
is one that is still somewhat unfamiliar in international
economics, and the geometryin which the convexity of the
relationship between fundamentals and prices plays a crucial role
——isnew and somewhat surprising,
The malt-i substantive result is that the expectation that the
authoritieswill defend a target zone will exert a stabilizing
influence on exchanqe rate behavior inside the zone. The extent of
this stabilizing influence depends on the sensitivity of the
current exchange rate toexchangerate expectations,the
volatility of the underlying determinants of the exchange rate,
and the credibility of the authorities' commitment.
The obvious next step in this research is to make the model
more realistic and interesting; this will involve both allowing a
more complex process generating fundamentals, and introducing some
"intrinsic" dynamicsarisingfrom suchsources as sluggish price
adj ustment.
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